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Abstract: Over 300 government members have had the main responsibility for international 
development cooperation in 23 member countries of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee 
since the organization started reporting detailed Official Development Assistance (ODA) data in 1967. 
Understanding their role in foreign aid giving is crucial since their decisions might directly impact aid 
effectiveness and thus economic development on the ground. Our study examines whether 
development ministers’ personal characteristics influence aid budgets and aid quality. To this end, we 
create a novel database on development ministers’ gender, political ideology, prior professional 
experience in development cooperation, education in economics, and time in office over the 1967-
2012 period. Results from fixed-effects panel regressions show that some of the personal 
characteristics of development ministers matter. Most notably, we find that more experienced 
ministers with respect to their time in office obtain larger aid budgets. Moreover, there is evidence that 
female ministers as well as officeholders with prior professional experience in development 
cooperation and a longer time in office provide higher-quality ODA. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
During the run up to Germany’s 2009 General Elections, the Free Democratic Party campaigned for 
the abolishment of the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development. When 
Chancellor Angela Merkel formed a coalition with the Free Democrats later that year, it was a 
frontrunner of the Free Democratic Party who took office in the ministry: Dirk Niebel, then the party’s 
General Secretary. Rather than sticking to the announcement to dissolve the ministry, the new minister 
asked for an increase in the ministry’s budget.1 Niebel did not have any professional experience in 
development cooperation when he took office, leading the German news magazine Stern to conclude: 
“Nobody can really say what actually qualifies Dirk Niebel as development aid minister.“2 
 Is a certain background of development ministers conducive to a better performance on the 
job? Does it matter who is in charge of development cooperation? Over 300 ministers responsible for 
development aid have entered (and left) office in 23 member countries of the OECD’s Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) since this institution started reporting detailed aid flows in 1967.3 30 
percent of the ministers are explicitly “Minister for Development Cooperation” (or have similar titles), 
while in most cases development aid has been the responsibility of the foreign minister. 18 percent of 
the ministers have been women and a mere 16 percent possessed any professional experience in 
development cooperation when they took office. While it is highly disputed whether (and how) 
aggregate aid affects the economic growth of developing countries (e.g., Burnside and Dollar 2000; 
Easterly, Levine and Roodman 2004),4 there is evidence that certain types of aid have positive effects 
on development outcomes (Dreher et al. 2008; Clemens et al. 2011; Bjørnskov 2013; but see also 
Roodman 2015). Moreover, scholarship has shed light on some unwelcome side-effects aid might 
have on conflict, governance, and sustainable development in general (e.g., Elbadawi et al. 2008; 
Bjørnskov 2010; Nunn and Qian 2013). Understanding the role played by development ministers in 
foreign aid is crucial since their decisions might influence both the quantity and the quality of aid and 
thus impact aid effectiveness and aggravate or mitigate potential side-effects of aid. 
 In order to study how the personal characteristics of development ministers affect donors’ aid 
giving, we build a novel database covering all ministers responsible for development cooperation since 
                                                     
1
 DIE WELT, “Neuer Minister: Niebel verlangt mehr Geld für Entwicklungshilfe,” WELT.de, 23 November 
2009, available at http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article5297548/Niebel-verlangt-mehr-Geld-fuer-
Entwicklungshilfe.html (accessed 26 November 2014). 
2
 Christ, Sebastian and Hans-Peter Schütz, “Entwicklungshilfeministerium: Dirk Niebel, Minister auf 
Bewährung,” stern.de, 29 October 2009 (own translation), available at 
http://www.stern.de/politik/deutschland/entwicklungshilfeministerium-dirk-niebel-minister-auf-bewaehrung-
1517745.html (accessed 26 November 2014). 
3
 As of the end of 2012, 23 countries (and the European Commission) were members of the OECD-DAC: 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States. We only cover aid provided by DAC donors in order to analyze a rather 
homogenous set of countries, often called “traditional” donor countries. 
4
 See Doucouliagos and Paldam (2009) for a meta study of the aid effectiveness literature. 
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1967. The study covers all country-years for which detailed aid flows have been reported to the 
OECD-DAC (as of July 28, 2014). Using panel econometric models, we then estimate the impact of 
development ministers’ personal characteristics on (1) aid quantity, i.e., the size of aid budgets in 
terms of Official Development Assistance (ODA),5 and (2) aid quality, i.e., the share of aid budgets 
that is expected to be particularly conducive to achieving developmental goals as operationalized by 
the foreign-assistance component of the Commitment to Development Index (CDI) (Roodman 2012). 
Specifically, we test whether these two variables are affected by the ministers’ gender, ideology, prior 
professional experience in development cooperation, university education in economics, and years in 
office. 
 Our paper combines two strands of the literature. First, it contributes to the empirical aid 
literature (e.g., Dudley 1979; Alesina and Dollar 2000; Kuziemko and Werker 2006) and to the 
scholarly work on aid budgets in particular (e.g., Bertoli et al. 2008; Tingley 2010; Dreher and Fuchs 
2011; Brech and Potrafke 2014; Fuchs et al. 2014). Second, the paper adds to the burgeoning literature 
on the effects of political leaders’ personal characteristics on economic outcomes. Previous research 
has focused on the role of gender (e.g., Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004; Koch and Fulton 2011), 
political ideology (e.g., Neuenkirch and Neumeier 2013), educational and professional background 
(e.g., Göhlmann and Vaubel 2007; Dreher et al. 2009; Spilimbergo 2009), regional and ethnic origin 
(e.g., Hodler and Raschky 2013; De Luca et al. 2015), socioeconomic status (Hayo and Neumeier 
2012, 2013, 2014), and time in office (e.g., Jochimsen and Thomasius 2014; Moessinger 2014). 
Contributions cover the role played by country leaders (e.g., Dreher et al. 2009; Besley et al. 2011), 
foreign ministers and defense ministers (Koch and Fulton 2011), finance ministers (Jochimsen and 
Thomasius 2012; Moessinger 2014), central bankers (e.g., Göhlmann and Vaubel 2007; Neuenkirch 
and Neumeier 2013), heads of subnational regions (Hayo and Neumeier 2012, 2014), and mayors 
(e.g., Freier and Thomasius 2012; Ferreira and Gyourko 2014), among others.6 
The development minister offers a particularly interesting case to reinvestigate the role of 
leadership since this position receives relatively little (domestic) attention compared to other cabinet 
members, such as the head of government, the minister of finance, or the minister of defense, despite 
its global importance. Development ministers have a low profile at home, usually being either annexed 
                                                     
5
 ODA is defined by the OECD (2008) as “those flows to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA 
Recipients (available at www.oecd.org/dac/stats/daclist) and to multilateral development institutions which are: 
i. provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies; and ii. 
each transaction of which: a) is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of 
developing countries as its main objective; and b) is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at 
least 25 per cent (calculated at a rate of discount of 10 per cent).” 
6
 A related literature analyzes how leadership changes (rather than personal characteristics) affect economic 
outcomes. See, for example, McGillivray and Smith (2004) for the impact on trade, Jones and Olken (2005) for 
growth effects, Moser and Dreher (2010) for reactions of financial markets, and Dreher and Jensen (2013) for the 
role in voting alignment in the United Nations General Assembly. 
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to their respective foreign ministry or having a low rank in cabinet.7 In those cases in which the 
development minister is appointed as foreign minister, as in Japan and the United States, it appears 
likely that the office holders are selected based on their stance on broader foreign policy and security 
issues rather than on their development profile. In sharp contrast to the disinterest in development 
issues in many governments, parliaments and the general public, aid decisions taken at donor 
ministries can have huge impacts on the ground as DAC countries alone provide more than US$ 100 
billion annually to the developing world. Our analysis thus adds to the study of the role of political 
leadership by examining a high-impact but low-profile government position. 
 The previous literature barely touches on the role of the decision-makers responsible for the 
provision of development assistance—despite the large consequences that their decisions might have 
on aid effectiveness and the (unwelcome) side-effects of aid. The existing papers that cover the role of 
development ministers only analyze the impact of the ministers’ gender. Dreher et al. (2015a) find that 
female development ministers are more responsive to gender issues when allocating aid than their 
male counterparts. Kleemann et al. (2014) discover only minor gender differences in the allocation of 
aid for education. A systematic analysis of development minister characteristics is thus still lacking. 
Additionally, since both papers do not control for female heads of government, their empirical 
strategies come with the drawback of not capturing the pure effect of the minister’s gender. 
Appointing a female development minister could just be a proxy for women having control over 
government in general.8 In order to identify a genuine effect stemming from the personal 
characteristics of the development minister, we control for the personal characteristics of the 
respective head of government and donor-country-fixed effects, or, alternatively, government-head-
fixed effects. Our paper thus not only provides the first test for the role of the personal characteristics 
of development ministers beyond gender for a large sample of donor countries,9 we also offer a 
rigorous empirical strategy and the first analysis of the ministers’ impact on the “development-
friendliness” of donors’ aid giving (“aid quality”). 
 Our results show that some personal characteristics of development ministers matter. Most 
notably, more experienced ministers with respect to their time in office obtain larger aid budgets: One 
additional year in office increases the total ODA commitments by 0.7 percent. Additionally, we find 
that the share of quality ODA increases by 1.1 percentage points if development ministers possess 
prior professional experience in the field of development cooperation and by 0.2 percentage points for 
                                                     
7
 For example, the development ministers are not full-ranked ministers in France (ministre délégué) and the 
United Kingdom (secretary of state). The German development minister has full cabinet rank but is the lowest 
ranked line minister according to German protocol. 
8
 Lu and Breuning (2014) control for the gender composition of governments in their analysis of the role of 
gender for aid generosity. However, they do not include donor-country-fixed effects so that observed effects may 
be driven by unobserved country characteristics. 
9
 Dreher et al. (2015b) analyze the role of the political color of both the Ministry of Economic Cooperation and 
Development and the Foreign Federal Office on German aid allocation. 
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each additional year in office. Moreover, aid quality is on average 1.0 percentage points higher if 
development ministers are female. 
 We proceed as follows. Section 2 discusses how we expect the personal characteristics of 
development ministers to shape the quantity and quality of ODA and introduces our hypotheses. 
Section 3 presents our novel dataset covering the characteristics of the 320 ministers that have been 
responsible for the OECD's development aid since 1967. Section 4 introduces the empirical approach 
and presents our results. The final section concludes and discusses avenues for future research. 
 
2. HOW CAN DEVELOPMENT MINISTER CHARACTERISTICS AFFECT AID GIVING? 
HYPOTHESES 
Earlier work already suggests that the person leading the ministry of development shapes the aid 
rhetoric within donor countries. Specifically, Breuning (1995) finds that the minister’s political 
affiliation has the potential to shape the debates in parliament in the three countries under study, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Investigating the case of Belgium specifically, 
Breuning (1999: 732) sees the development minister having “considerable latitude within the bounds 
of general policy directives.” Anecdotal evidence also suggests that this latitude allows ministers to set 
the development agenda according to their background. Interviews conducted with employees from 
the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development reveal that the ministry’s 
work usually switches its focus when a new minister assumes office.10 For example, the German 
development policy was perceived to have become more market-oriented when the Free Democrat 
Dirk Niebel took office. Tellingly, he advertised his ministry by stating that “[…] from every Euro 
spent on bilateral development cooperation, 1.80 Euro flow back to the German economy.”11 In the 
beginning of each year, the minister is responsible for the framework development planning, in which 
she or he decides how the aid budget will be allocated to countries, sectors and modalities. If 
development ministers possess sufficient power to shape decision-making, their personal 
characteristics should affect the quantity and quality of aid. In what follows, we discuss how we 
expect the gender, political ideology and experience of a development minister to affect aid giving. 
 
  
                                                     
10
 Authors’ phone interviews on 27 October 2014. We are grateful to employees from the German Federal 
Ministry of Economic Development and Cooperation for these insights. 
11
 Grefe, Christiane and Jörg Lau, “Korruption tötet,” zeit.de, 22 July 2011 (own translation), available at 
http://www.zeit.de/2011/30/Interview-Niebel/seite-2 (accessed 8 September 2015). 
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(a) Gender 
Women and men show significant differences in their preferences.12 Empirical evidence shows, for 
example, that government size and social spending increase as women obtain the right to vote (Lott 
and Kenny 1999; Aidt and Dallal 2008). Funk and Gathmann (2015) observe for Switzerland that 
women are more likely to vote in favor of policies supporting environmental protection, health and 
social welfare as well as to oppose military spending. Togeby (1994) identifies a gender gap in foreign 
policy attitudes: women are on average more supportive of development aid (and less supportive of 
military interventions). 
 However, it is unclear whether such gender differences in individuals’ preferences also 
translate into politicians’ actual decision-making.13 Strategic considerations, including party pressure 
or log-rolling, may prevent these differences from affecting policies (Funk and Gathmann 2015). 
Scholarly evidence is mixed on whether the described overall larger support of women for social 
policies—and development aid in particular—is reflected in legislators’ decisions on aid policies. 
While Breuning (2001), Hicks et al. (2014), and Lu and Breuning (2014) find that stronger female 
representation in parliament increases aid budgets, this finding is not confirmed by empirical evidence 
in Lundsgaarde, Breunig and Prakash (2007).14 Analyzing US congressional roll call votes, Olsen-
Telles (2013) finds that female legislators are less likely to support military aid as expected, but—in 
contrast to expectations—they do not appear to be more supportive of economic aid. 
Predictions are also not straightforward with respect to total ODA budgets when it comes to 
the role of female development ministers rather than parliamentarians. Independently of gender-
specific differences in the ministers’ stance towards foreign aid, ministers have a vested interest in 
maximizing their respective budget as a greater budget increases their chances of success as a minister 
(and should thus affect their chance of being promoted and re-elected). Consequently, there should be 
no significant difference in the size of aid budgets between female-led and male-led aid ministries. 
However, empirical evidence points at systematic gender differences in negotiation outcomes, such as 
in salary negotiations, in which women are worse off than men (e.g., Gerhart and Rynes 1991). 
Explanations include, among others, women’s lower willingness to self-promote, and negotiation 
partners, both male and female, who make lower offers to women since they assume the female 
negotiators to give in more easily than their male counterparts (Solnick 2001). These findings based on 
business environments might also apply to political negotiations. Accordingly, it could be argued that 
male ministers successfully negotiate for larger aid budgets than female ministers. 
                                                     
12
 Croson and Gneezy (2009) review experimental evidence on gender-specific differences in risk preferences, 
social preferences, and competitive preferences. 
13
 Empirical evidence in the development context suggests that this is the case (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004; 
Clots-Figueras 2011). 
14
 Similarly, Fuchs et al. (2014) do not find the share of women in national parliaments to be a robust 
determinant of donors’ aid generosity, as measured by the ODA-over-GNI ratio. 
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Turning to the specific allocation of aid, Hicks et al. (2014) find strong evidence of gender 
differences arising from larger female representation in parliaments: the level of the flows going to 
humanitarian efforts, education, health and social capital projects all appear to increase with stronger 
representation of women in national parliaments. Moreover, a higher share of women in a national 
parliament is also associated with more aid flowing to LDCs. One could thus expect that donor 
countries with female development ministers also provide a higher ODA quality than those with male 
development ministers. This would be consistent with evidence of gender differences in foreign policy 
attitudes discussed above (e.g., Togeby 1994). 
However, there are reasons to believe that such “female behavior” does not hold at the level of 
political leaders. Analyzing the role of gender in foreign policy, Koch and Fulton (2011) show that 
female representation in parliaments causes a decrease in defense spending and conflict behavior but 
they find the opposite effect for female defense ministers and government heads. In the words of Koch 
and Fulton (2011), “[w]hen it comes to masculinized leadership positions, like executive office, this 
challenge to gain credibility may lead women to present themselves as more masculine, in an attempt 
to combat the stereotype.” Given that women face more barriers to access leadership positions, 
Jochimsen and Thomasius (2014: 394), referring to Eagly et al. (1995), note that “[i]f a woman must 
be ‘twice as good as a man’ in order to be appointed to a leadership position […] then women may be 
more effective leaders and superior performers compared to their male colleagues.” Similarly, 
empirical evidence on monetary policy suggests that women take more “hawkish” decisions than their 
male counterparts (Farvaque et al. 2009). Translating this to the case of development ministers, one 
might expect “tougher” behavior from female development ministers in negotiations over budgets and 
in their usage of budgets in the sense that they pursue a more self-interested development policy at the 
detriment of aid quality. This would imply larger aid budgets and a lower aid quality under female 
development ministers compared to years in which male development ministers are in office. 
Existing empirical evidence on gender effects of development ministers, however, is rather 
weak. While Dreher et al. (2015a) find little evidence overall of a link between female representation 
in donor countries and a more gender-related need- or merit-based aid allocation, they show that 
female development ministers channel more aid to countries with low and unequal female tertiary 
enrolment, low and unequal female life expectancy, and with a higher share of women in parliament. 
Analyzing a single aid sector (education), Kleemann et al. (2014) find only minor gender differences 
in aid allocation between female and male ministers.15 
  
                                                     
15
 Note that Kleemann et al. (2014) and Dreher et al. (2015a) do not control for the characteristics of the 
respective head of government, which may lead to spurious results as we outline below in greater detail. 
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(b) Political ideology 
Scholarship has scrutinized the effects of government ideology on aid giving. Concerning the quantity 
of aid, a couple of studies have analyzed the role played by government ideology in donor generosity. 
As summarized by Fuchs et al. (2014: 177), “right-wing governments are often expected to provide 
less aid than left-wing governments since the latter have usually limited trust in markets and are more 
prone to redistribution.” At the same time, it is argued that right-wing governments are more prone to 
provide larger aid budgets as they see aid as a tool to promote commercial and geostrategic interests 
(Fuchs et al. 2014). Thérien and Noël (2000), for example, provide evidence for the first argument and 
find that social democratic governments are associated with higher levels of ODA in the long run. 
Similarly, Tingley (2010) shows evidence that aid budgets increase when left-wing governments come 
to power. However, such a relationship does not appear to be conclusive. For example, Lundsgaarde et 
al. (2007) find political ideology to be insignificant, and, according to Bertoli et al. (2008), right-wing 
governments provide even more aid. Analyzing German aid allocation, Dreher et al. (2015b) similarly 
find that aid commitments from ministries led by the Social Democrats are lower than those run by 
conservatives or liberals. 
Since inconclusive results cast doubts whether there is a partisan effect at the level of 
governments, we also do not expect the political orientation of development ministers to 
systematically affect the size of aid volumes. We argue instead that ministers aim to maximize their 
budgets independent of their respective political ideology as in doing so they expand their political 
influence. 
 Beyond potential direct effects of government ideology, scholarship has shown that more 
fractionalized governments have larger government expenditures (e.g., Roubini and Sachs 1989). 
Government fractionalization also appears to be relevant in the aid context: a larger number of parties 
results in more compromises and more concessions being granted to each party (Dreher and Langlotz 
2015). Round and Odedokun (2004: 300-301) argue that “[t]he greater the lack of cohesion within the 
government (e.g., because it is a coalition of parties with more or less incongruent ideologies and 
policies), the greater the need to make more budgetary allocations for aid.” While they also do not find 
a significant relationship between government ideology and aid budgets, their results show that more 
fractionalized governments provide significantly more aid. Diverging interests within the government 
should be particularly relevant in the aid context if the head of government and the development 
minister are associated with different political parties. We thus hypothesize that the quantity of ODA 
increases if the development minister and the head of government have different political ideological 
orientations. 
In contrast to aid budgets, development ministers’ political orientation might affect the quality 
of aid. Brech and Potrafke (2014) find that left-wing governments experience stronger increases in 
10 
 
bilateral grant aid and grant aid to least developed and lower middle-income countries. This might 
suggest that left-wing governments provide a higher aid quality compared to right-wing governments 
as such an allocation pattern leads to lower future financial obligations for recipient countries and is 
more need-oriented. It has been argued that right-wing decision-makers are guided to a greater extent 
by domestic political and commercial interests than their left-wing counterparts who are expected to 
believe more in the merits of redistribution and have a more internationalist stance.16 However, 
empirical evidence in this regard is mixed. While Fleck and Kilby (2006) find that development 
concerns in the United States matter more under a Democratic president and Congress compared to 
when the president and/or Congress are Republican, Dreher et al. (2015b) come to very different 
conclusions with respect to Germany. Analyzing German aid allocation, they reject claims that aid 
allocation by conservatives is guided to a larger extent by commercial and politico-strategic interests 
than aid from left-wing decision-makers. 
 
(c) Technical experience 
Prior research shows that the professional background of political decision-makers affects their 
decisions when in office. According to the empirical results in Göhlmann and Vaubel (2007), for 
example, former central bank staff prefer lower inflation rates than former politicians after being 
appointed to central bank councils.17 Dreher et al. (2009) find that entrepreneurs and professional 
scientists are more likely to implement market-liberalizing reforms compared to politicians with other 
professional backgrounds. 
 Based on these results, we expect professional background to also affect development 
ministers’ decision-making. Specifically, prior experience in development cooperation, including work 
experience in aid agencies, development NGOs and embassies, among others, should influence the 
work of the minister having the main responsibility for development cooperation. There are at least 
two reasons why such technical experience could matter. First, politicians who have worked in the 
field could become more caring about development and thus direct more resources to development-
enhancing activities to the detriment of donor self-interests.18 This should positively affect the quality 
of aid, which is largely under the development minister’s influence, but not the quantity of aid, as 
greater development affinity does not necessarily translate into better negotiation skills at the cabinet 
table. Second, ministers with field experience learn how aid can be quality-enhancing as they observe 
                                                     
16
 See Fuchs et al. (2014) for a summary of the relevant literature. 
17
 See Farvaque et al. (2009) for a similar conclusion. Neuenkirch and Neumeier (2013), however, do not find 
significant effects of the professional background of central bank governors on interest rates. They conclude that 
party affiliation rather than former occupation affects monetary policy. 
18
 Obviously, it should not only be the case that politicians with development experience become more 
development-oriented, more development-oriented politicians should also be more likely to go into the field in 
the first place. 
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the success and failures of aid interventions.19 We thus hypothesize that ODA quality is higher if the 
development minister has acquired professional experience in development cooperation. 
Turning to education, the empirical evidence that specific educational background matters for 
political decision-making is much weaker than for prior occupations (Göhlmann and Vaubel 2007; 
Dreher et al. 2009; Jochimsen and Thomasius 2014; Moessinger 2014).20 Still, there are reasons to 
believe that a training in economics can make a difference when there is strong need for economic 
expertise such as in the context of economic development. In this regard, Hallerberg and Wehner 
(2012) find that countries with a high frequency of financial crises, such as Greece and Portugal, are 
more likely to appoint economists as economic policymakers than other OECD countries. Dreher et al. 
(2009: 170) identify a potential advantage of trained economists “in implementing reforms as they are 
more likely to distinguish good from bad advice and might be more able to resist the pressure of 
lobbying groups preferring the status quo.” Similarly, economics-trained development ministers might 
be in a better position to implement effective development policies as they better understand the 
market mechanisms and market failures at play in developing countries and are thus better able to 
identify successful development measures. If this is true, we should observe larger aid quality when 
the development minister has obtained a degree of higher education in economics. At the same time, 
however, economists are found to be more selfish (e.g., Frey and Meier 2003) and might thus exhibit a 
stronger focus on donor self-interests to the detriment of aid quality. It is hence an empirical question 
which of the two countervailing effects of economics training on aid quality dominates. 
Finally, to the extent to which economists are better bargainers, aid budgets of economics-
trained development ministers should be larger. In line with this, Jochimsen and Thomasius (2014: 
394) evoke the possibility that “trained economists […] are more successful in convincing their 
cabinet colleagues of sound budgets with low deficits,” but they do not find empirical support for the 
hypothesis that the educational background of German state finance ministers influences the fiscal 
performance of the respective states. Similarly, debt-to-GDP ratios do not appear to be affected by the 
economics training of the finance ministers of OECD countries (Moessinger 2014). Given the lack of 
empirical support for finance ministers, we also do not expect to observe larger aid budgets when 
economics-trained development ministers are in office. 
 
  
                                                     
19
 Jacqmin and Lefebvre (2015) make a similar argument for education ministers. They find that ministers with 
work experience in the sector perform better on the job. 
20
 Analyzing the level of education rather than specific educations, Besley et al. (2011) find that countries’ 
economic growth increases with their leaders’ educational attainment. According to Freier and Thomasius 
(2012), there is no such effect of the education level of German mayors on the overall fiscal performance of their 
municipalities. 
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(d) Political experience 
Beyond ministers’ technical experience acquired prior to taking office, their experience on the job 
could also affect aid giving. Usually, the political power of ministers increases with their time in office 
as they accumulate experience. Referring to finance ministers, Feld and Schaltegger (2010: 509) argue 
that a “minister who succeeds in remaining a long time in office usually enjoys a politically powerful 
position towards the parliament, the administration and the interest groups.” Moessinger (2014: 185) 
assumes that “an experienced finance minister […] know[s] more about the schemes of his cabinet 
colleagues in attracting additional funds for their respective ministries.”21 Along similar lines, more 
experienced heads of other ministries should better know how to successfully secure funds for their 
respective budgets as they can more forcefully oppose the finance minister and more successfully 
compete against other cabinet colleagues. We thus expect ODA budgets to increase with the length of 
the tenure of development ministers. Moreover, more experienced development ministers should have 
acquired more knowledge over time on the types of aid that work. Assuming that development 
ministers want to increase the impact of development aid (out of humanitarian motives or career 
concerns), we expect that development ministers learn over time how to provide more effective aid 
and shift resources accordingly. If the incentives to build reputation increase with the time horizon 
(Besley and Case 1995), development ministers with longer tenures should care more about donor 
performance.22 Taken together, we expect the amount of ODA and its quality to increase with 
development ministers’ political experience acquired through their time in office. 
 
3. WHO ARE THE DEVELOPMENT MINISTERS? A NEW DATASET 
We define “development minister” as the donor country’s government member that holds the main 
responsibility for development cooperation.23 We first identify the names and governing periods of all 
development ministers for the years in which the respective OECD-DAC donor reports detailed aid 
flows to the OECD’s Creditor Reporting System (i.e., since 1967 at the earliest).24 We collect the 
required data through internet research from publicly available sources, including government 
websites, the personal websites of the ministers, Political Data Yearbook interactive,25 and Wikipedia, 
                                                     
21
 Accordingly, Moessinger’s (2014) analysis on public debt in Western European countries (1980-2010) shows 
that the increase in a country’s debt-to-GDP ratio declines with the respective finance minister’s time in office. 
Studying the fiscal performance of German states between 1960 and 2009, Jochimsen and Thomasius (2014) 
find a significant decrease in budget deficits if the finance minister’s tenure exceeds 4.7 years. 
22
 The chances to get promoted, i.e., to the head of government, increases with tenure and this shifts ministers’ 
career incentives. See Feld and Schaltegger (2010). 
23
 The respective cabinet member is either a minister, minister of state or secretary of state. In what follows, we 
use the term “development minister” for the sake of brevity. 
24
 We attribute years during which two or more development ministers are in office to the minister who is 
longest in power during that year. In six cases, however, two ministers were equally long in office (6 months). 
We then keep the minister being in office for the last six months in our dataset. 
25
 See http://www.politicaldatayearbook.com/ (last accessed 11 December 2014). 
13 
 
among others. Where necessary, we contacted the ministries or other government institutions via e-
mail to gather additional information. Following the described procedure, we obtain a dataset with 957 
observations containing 320 ministers for 23 OECD-DAC countries between 1967 and 2012, i.e., for a 
maximum of 46 years per country. 
 To be able to study how the personal characteristics of development ministers affect donors’ 
aid giving, we then collect information on five personal characteristics of development ministers—
mirroring the hypotheses introduced in the previous section. First, we collect information on the 
ministers’ genders. The dummy variable for a minister’s gender is coded as one for women. Across all 
OECD-DAC donors under analysis, a female minister is in charge of development cooperation in one 
fifth of all country-years. For comparison, only 5 percent of all heads of governments are women in 
our dataset. Sweden shows the largest proportion of female-led development cooperation with women 
being in power over 27 of 46 years, closely followed by Canada with 26 years. In Australia, Italy, and 
South Korea, the position of the development minister has never been assigned to a woman (as of 
2012).26 Analyzing the gender distribution over time, Figure 1a shows a sharp increase in the number 
of female development ministers starting with the turn of the century. While only 14 percent of 
ministers are female by 1990, the share of women increases to 43 percent in 2000. In the peak years of 
2001, 2005 and 2006, the gender distribution is almost balanced with a total of 11 female ministers in 
23 countries. 
Second, we gather data on ministers’ political ideologies measured on a five-tier left-right 
scale. Bjørnskov and Potrafke (2011) use the social democratic party as an “anchor party,” following 
the idea that its national branches are broadly comparable on the international level. They assign a 
value of 0 to social democratic parties and classify the remaining political parties accordingly. 
Following their approach, we code the political ideology of development ministers with regards to the 
economic policy position of the political party they are affiliated with.27 Specifically, a value of -1 is 
assigned to “unreformed socialist and communist,” -0.5 to “modern socialist,” 0 to “social 
democratic,” 0.5 to “conservative,” and 1 to “liberalist economic policy.”28 We find that the position 
of the development minister is—with 48 percent of all country-years covered—almost as equally often 
assigned to left-wing politicians (including social democrats) than to right-wing politicians (52 
                                                     
26
 Julie Bishop assumed office in Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in 2013 and thus became 
Australia’s first female development minister. 
27
 In cases where ministers are not party members, we code their economic policy orientation based on other 
relevant information provided in their CVs (such as memberships in relevant associations). In the absence of 
such information, we code them in line with the respective head of government which has selected the respective 
minister. 
28
 In countries without a social democratic party, such as France for instance, we follow Bjørnskov and Potrafke 
(2011) and code ministers’ parties relative to a fictional central party to keep the classification pattern consistent. 
We are grateful to Christian Bjørnskov for having generously provided us with their raw database that enabled us 
to translate their categorization of the ideologies of political parties to the case of development ministers. 
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percent; see Figure 1b for details). No unreformed socialist or communist has been appointed over the 
time period under study. 
Third, we collect information on whether the development ministers possess development-
specific work experience when they take office. Specifically, we code a dummy variable that takes a 
value of one if the minister has gained professional experience in the field of development 
cooperation.29 As can be seen in Figure 1c, a large majority of development ministers lack relevant 
work experience in the development context upon assuming office. Only 16 percent possess of any 
prior work experience in development cooperation when coming into power. 
Fourth, the database includes information on whether the ministers have obtained a degree of 
higher education in economics or business administration. 23 percent of all ministers have received 
such training (see again Figure 1c). 
Fifth, in addition to ministers’ experience prior to taking office, we also examine their political 
experience gained on the job. Specifically, we calculate the number of years a minister holds office in 
a given year, irrespective of whether the period in office was interrupted by another minister’s term or 
not. Almost 15 percent of the ministers hold office for only one year, which demonstrates a relatively 
large fluctuation in the position. The average tenure of a development minister is 3 years. There is 
much more fluctuation in the office of the development ministers (320 ministers overall) compared to 
heads of governments (207). Luxembourg’s Jacques Poos is the minister that gained most experience 
in office (15 years). Figure 1d plots the average tenure of ministers in power over time. 
To sum up, the typical minister is male, stays in power for three years and cannot be clearly 
attributed to one of the two political camps of left or right. He has neither received economics training 
nor gained prior professional experience in development cooperation. Appendix A1 lists all 
development ministers covered by our database. 
 
4. AND DO THEY MATTER? AN ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
(a) Empirical Approach 
In order to analyze the role of development ministers in shaping the size and “development-
friendliness” of a donor’s development cooperation, we estimate the impact of the development 
ministers’ personal characteristics on (1) the size of aid budgets (TotalODA), and (2) the quality of aid 
                                                     
29
 We code professional experience in development cooperation as one if ministers have worked for international 
development organizations (e.g., the United Nations Development Programme), national development agencies 
(e.g., the Agence Française de Développement), or non-governmental organizations addressing development 
concerns (e.g., Médecins sans Frontières). Additionally, we code this variable as one if the development minister 
led the development ministry in a prior term. 
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(QualityODA). To account for TotalODA, we use a donor country’s total amount of ODA in 
logarithms and measured in constant 2012 US$ (OECD 2014).30 We analyze both ODA commitments 
and disbursements as both measures come with their respective advantages and disadvantages. 
Commitments allow us to capture the impact that the development minister exerts directly on 
development policy. Disbursements in a particular year on the contrary may already have been 
committed under a minister’s predecessor and thus falsely be attributed to the successor. The use of 
disbursements, however, comes with the advantage that one accounts for the development minister’s 
influence on the current spending process. Moreover, Roodman (2012) points to the potential risk of 
overestimating aid when using aid commitments if ministers knowingly or unknowingly over-promise 
aid. Thus, only disbursements mirror the actual effort of donor countries. As can be seen from Figure 
2, ODA disbursements are systematically smaller than ODA commitments. 
The measurement of QualityODA is not straightforward. Although several comprehensive 
indices propose various ways to measure the quality of ODA (Easterly 2002; Easterly and Pfutze 
2008; Birdsall and Kharas 2010; Knack et al. 2011; Roodman 2012), to our knowledge, none of these 
indicators have been computed for the years prior to 1995. In this paper, we make use of the quality-
adjusted aid measure developed by Roodman (2012) since it is available for the longest time period 
(1995-2011) and offers a convincing approach to analyze our research question. Roodman (2012) 
discounts gross ODA disbursements for several factors that are judged as reducing the effectiveness of 
aid. He first subtracts debt forgiveness grants and rescheduled debt from OECD-defined ODA to 
obtain his measure of “gross aid.” He then adjusts the amount of “gross aid” by the extent to which a 
donor’s aid is tied, by principal and interest payments, and by administrative costs. Finally, Roodman 
also rewards policies that are expected to increase a donor’s development impact. Specifically, he 
implements a selectivity weight for ODA given to poorer and to well-governed countries and rewards 
tax policies that support charitable giving. The resulting measure of “quality-adjusted aid” is the 
amount of ODA that is estimated to be effective. As our measure of aid quality, we divide Roodman’s 
quality-adjusted bilateral aid disbursements by his total bilateral gross aid disbursements. The 
resulting average values of QualityODA range between 18 percent for Japan and 56 percent for 
Sweden (see also Figure 2).31 Figure 3 shows for four important donors how both TotalODA and 
QualityODA evolve over the terms of development ministers.32 
We regress our two dependent variables on the same set of independent variables, testing for a 
potential role of the ministers’ gender, their political ideology, and their experience as captured by 
                                                     
30
 Note that we add a value of US$ 1 to all ODA values before taking logarithms so as not to lose zero values in 
our sample. 
31
 In our dataset, Portugal constitutes an outlier as its aid quality is highly volatile and it is the only donor that 
shows a negative quality-adjusted ODA value in a year (1997). This occurs as the country disproportionally 
supports richer recipients in that year. Hence, we set Portugal’s value of QualityODA to zero in 1997. Note that 
our results below are robust to the exclusion of Portugal from our regressions. 
32
 In Appendix A3, we show for each individual donor how aid quantity and quality developed since 1967. 
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their prior professional experience in development cooperation, education in economics, and time in 
office.33 Our regression equations read as follows: 
(1) log(TotalODAit) = β1 log(TotalODAit-1) + β2 Genderit-1 + β3 Ideologyit-1 + Σl β4l Experienceilt-1 +  
Σm β5m Controlsimt-1 + ηi + µt + uit 
(2) QualityODAit = γ1 QualityODAit-1 + γ2 Genderit + γ3 Ideologyit + Σl γ4l Experienceilt +                 
Σm γ5m Controlsimt + ηi + µt + vit 
The index i refers to the respective donor country, t stands for the respective year, l allows for the 
three different measures of experience, and m identifies the 15 variables that form our set of control 
variables described below. 
 While we lag all independent variables in the TotalODA regression by one year, the variables 
enter simultaneously in the QualityODA regression. This is because development ministers should 
have the greatest influence on the country’s total ODA budget during budget negotiations, which 
usually take place in the previous year, but their decisions simultaneously affect the usage of the ODA 
budget as captured by QualityODA.34 
 In order to identify a genuine effect stemming from the personal characteristics of the 
development minister, we additionally control for the corresponding personal characteristics of the 
respective head of government.35 The inclusion of these control variables prevents us from falsely 
attributing the influence of heads of government to development ministers. Such a correlation is most 
obvious for political ideology as the selection of the development minister by the head of government 
will be a function of their respective political orientations.36 Female heads of government might also 
be more likely to appoint female ministers and a similar argument can easily be made for heads of 
government with professional experience in development cooperation or training in economics due to 
networks or affinity towards candidates with similar characteristics. Moreover, government-head and 
minister characteristics might also be interlinked in more complex ways. For example, to the extent to 
which left-wing heads of government are more likely to appoint female ministers (Escobar-Lemmon 
and Taylor-Robinson 2005), a significant effect of the minister’s gender might be driven by the 
political orientation of the head of government instead. Applying the same logic to the legislative, we 
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 Although there are no clear expectations on how minister age could affect aid quantity and quality, we also 
explored a potential role of age. Since age never turned out to have a significant impact on either dependent 
variable, we excluded age from our specifications. 
34
 The contemporaneous impact of ministers on the specific use of aid budgets was confirmed by authors’ phone 
interviews with employees of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development on 27 
October 2014. 
35
 We build on the dataset in Bjørnskov and Potrafke (2011), which is in turn based on Woldendorp et al. (2000), 
to create a dataset on the characteristics of donor countries’ heads of government. 
36
 This also applies to coalition governments since parties with a similar political orientation are more likely to 
build a coalition. The correlation between the ideology of ministers and heads of government in our sample is 
0.656. 
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additionally include the share of women in parliament (data from Brady et al. 2014 and World Bank 
2014) and the mean ideological orientation of parliament members (data from Bjørnskov and Potrafke 
2011) as control variables. Moreover, we construct a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the 
political orientation of the development minister and the head of government is different, as outlined 
in Section 2. 
 In the selection of the remaining control variables, we follow Fuchs et al. (2014) and Brech 
and Potrafke (2014). Fuchs et al. (2014) survey the aid budget literature and analyze the robust 
determinants of donors’ aid budgets using an extreme bounds analysis. Based on their findings (see 
Table 5 in Fuchs et al. 2014), we include the lagged dependent variable, donors’ (logged) per-capita 
GDP (World Bank 2014), a donor country’s level of political globalization (Dreher 2006; Dreher et al. 
2008), a dummy for the existence of an aid agency in the donor country (Fuchs et al. 2014), and the 
logged size of the population living in the donor’s former colonies (Mayer and Zignago 2006; World 
Bank 2014). Brech and Potrafke (2014) conduct a similar analysis to ours as they also analyze 
subcomponents of ODA. Following them, we further control for trade openness and government 
expenditure, both as a share of GDP (World Bank 2014). Finally, we add a donor country’s debt-over-
GDP ratio as it is a standard variable in the aid budget literature (Fuchs et al. 2014). Table 1 provides 
descriptive statistics and Appendix A2 gives an overview of all variables used, their definitions and 
sources. 
 We estimate our baseline models with ordinary least squares (OLS) using donor-country- and 
year-fixed effects and standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the 
government-head level. Such a fixed-effects estimation that includes a lagged dependent variable may 
lead to inconsistent estimators and induce the so-called Nickell bias through the correlation of the 
lagged dependent variable with the error term (Nickell 1981). However, with an average number of 
time periods per donor of over 35 years, the problem should be negligible in our TotalODA 
regressions and OLS appropriate. Since the time period covered in our QualityODA regressions is 
much shorter with a maximum of 17 years, we also show results from two further specifications: first, 
we exclude the lagged dependent variable; second, we correct the bias with the correction procedure 
developed by Bruno (2005a, 2005b) for unbalanced dynamic panel models.37 Finally, we also estimate 
regressions with the more conservative specification that includes government-head-fixed effects 
instead of donor-country-fixed effects. 
  
                                                     
37
 Following Potrafke (2009), we choose the System Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator, which 
is the most comprehensive estimator, to initialize the correcting procedure. However, Monte Carlo experiments 
show only marginal differences in the corrected estimates when the initializations change (Bruno 2005b). This is 
in line with what we find (results are available upon request). 
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(b) The Quantity of ODA 
Table 2 presents the results for aid budgets. We start by analyzing the results of a specification that 
excludes government-head characteristics (columns 1 and 2) and then add the personal characteristics 
of the heads of government as well as variables capturing the gender and ideological composition of 
national parliaments to make sure that we identify a genuine effect stemming from the characteristics 
of development ministers (columns 3 and 4). We examine both total ODA commitments (columns 1 
and 3) and total ODA disbursements (columns 2 and 4). Our model has large explanatory power as 
evidenced by the R-squared of more than 80 percent. It is also reassuring that the results for the 
control variables are largely in line with expectations: we find evidence for persistent ODA budgets 
and for donors providing more ODA as they grow richer, as shown by the positive and highly 
significant coefficients on lagged DV and (log) GDP per capita. Openness and government 
expenditure enter with the expected positive sign but do not reach statistical significance at 
conventional levels in each specification. A higher debt-over-GDP ratio is associated with lower total 
ODA levels, at the one-percent level of significance. Political globalization shows the expected 
significant positive relationship with the quantity of aid, at least at the ten-percent level. The existence 
of an aid agency in the donor country is positively linked with total ODA disbursements (but not with 
commitments), at the one-percent level of significance. In line with Bertoli et al. (2008), ODA budgets 
appear to work as substitutes for a colonial legacy, at least at the ten-percent level of significance. 
Turning to the interpretation of the results for our variables of interest, we do not find a 
significant relationship between the gender of development ministers (and heads of government) and 
TotalODA. However, the coefficient on female parliament, i.e., the share of women in national 
parliaments, is positive and statistically significant at least at the five-percent level—in line with the 
findings in Hicks et al. (2014). A one-percent increase in the share of female deputies in parliament 
raises ODA commitments by 0.7 percent and ODA disbursements by 0.4 percent on average (columns 
3 and 4). This finding shows that female representation matters, but at the legislative not executive 
level (see also Lu and Breuning 2014). 
We also do not find a significant link between ODA volumes and development ministers’ 
political orientation on a left-right scale of economic policy orientation.38 This is in line with our 
expectations: ministers fight for an increase in their budgets independently of where they stand 
ideologically. Also, the political ideology of the heads of government does not appear to affect aid 
budgets—an unsurprising result given prior empirical research summarized in Fuchs et al. (2014). 
However, we again find differences between the executive and parliament. More economically liberal 
parliaments are associated with larger total ODA disbursements at the five-percent level of 
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 Our findings are similar when we replace the five-tier-scaled variable with a simple dummy variable for right-
wing ministers (conservative or economically liberal parties). Results are available upon request. 
19 
 
significance.39 Moving one ideological unit to the right—such as from social democratic to 
economically liberalist—increases disbursements by 23 percent. When we split the sample into the 
Cold War and post-Cold War period (see Appendix B, columns 3-4, for details), we find that the effect 
stems from the Cold War era. This finding casts doubts on widespread expectations that more right-
wing parliaments provide less aid and thus corroborates similar results in Dreher et al. (2015b). 
Alternatively, this could also hint at right-wing politicians using aid during the Cold War more 
intensively as a geostrategic instrument than left-wing politicians. 
The dummy variable ideological difference, indicating that the head of government and 
development minister have different political orientations, turns out to be positive and statistically 
significant at least at the five-percent level. Divided governments show an increase of total ODA 
commitments by 7 percent and of total ODA disbursements by 4 percent. This supports the view that 
diverging interests within the government causes each partner to grant the other partner more 
concessions (e.g., Dreher and Langlotz 2015). 
With respect to our experience variables, we find that ODA budgets increase with the tenure 
of the development minister, at conventional levels of significance (columns 1-4). More precisely, 
each additional year of experience as development minister increases ODA commitments by 0.7 
percent and disbursements by 0.6 percent on average (columns 3 and 4).40 Taking this at face value, 
Luxembourg’s Jacques Poos in his 15th year would have been able to secure an aid budget that is 
roughly 10 percent larger than that of a newcomer. As hypothesized, political experience appears to 
provide ministers with an advantage in their fight for higher budgets. There is also some evidence that 
political experience of heads of government has the opposite, negative effect on aid budgets, as 
evidenced by the negative significant coefficient on tenure gov. head in column 4 (at the ten-percent 
level). More experience in office seems to enable heads of government to better defend against 
demands for budget increases. An additional year of experience as head of government is associated 
with a reduction of ODA disbursements by 0.3 percent. In contrast to on-the-job experience, 
development ministers’ prior professional experience in development cooperation (prof. dev. coop. 
minister) and training in economics (economics minister) do not seem to affect ODA budgets as none 
of the corresponding coefficients reaches statistical significance at conventional levels. On the 
contrary, we find evidence for larger aid budgets when the government is led by a trained economist. 
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 2 present regressions with government-head-fixed effects rather 
than government-head characteristics and donor-country-fixed effects. In this very strict specification, 
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 This finding is not robust for commitments but holds when we exclude the lagged dependent variable 
(Appendix B, columns 1 and 2). 
40
 When we omit the lagged dependent variable, the effect increases to 1.3 percent (Appendix B, columns 1-2). 
The finding appears to be driven by the post-Cold War period (Appendix B, columns 3-6). Given the inclusion 
of the lagged dependent variable, the values above correspond only to the short-run effect of tenure. Taking 
account of the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable, we obtain long-run effects of 1.3 and 1.7 percent, 
respectively. 
20 
 
we only identify the possible effects of development minister characteristics on aid budgets through 
variation of development ministers within the tenure of each particular head of government. Focusing 
on the variables of interest for the sake of brevity, the results confirm our main findings from above. 
Development ministers’ experience in office appears to be the only relevant minister characteristic that 
plays a role for aid budgets. Tenure minister remains positive and statistically significant at the five-
percent level for ODA disbursements, while all other development minister characteristics do not 
reach statistical significance in this conservative specification. 
The analysis so far has covered total ODA budgets, i.e., both bilateral and multilateral flows. 
One may argue that development ministers have more direct control over bilateral aid budgets as they 
can only influence voluntary contributions to multilateral organizations among multilateral aid flows 
but not core contributions, which are binding in principle.41 When analyzing bilateral ODA budgets 
(see Appendix B, columns 7-8, for details), we obtain similar results with respect to female parliament 
and different ideologies as both are significantly positively associated with bilateral ODA budgets. 
There is again, albeit weaker, evidence of a positive association between ministers’ tenure and ODA 
disbursements. 
 To sum up, the development ministers’ personal characteristics do not seem to matter much 
with regards to the quantity of ODA. Only one finding appears to be largely robust: a longer time in 
office strengthens the ministers’ ability to negotiate higher ODA budgets. The appointment of more 
experienced ministers can thus help countries to achieve the UN target to provide 0.7 percent of GNI 
as development aid. Political experience seems to pay off. 
 
(c) The Quality of ODA 
Table 3 shows our results for ODA quality. We begin our analysis with specifications that exclude the 
lagged dependent variable (columns 1 and 2). While the regression in column 1 additionally excludes 
government-head and legislative controls, these variables are included in column 2. Starting with the 
interpretation of the results for the control variables, the coefficient on (log) GDP per capita is 
positive and reaches statistical significance at the five-percent level. High-quality ODA thus seems to 
be a luxury good: as countries become richer, incentives to provide self-interested aid shrink. In line 
with this explanation, a larger debt-to-GDP ratio is associated with significantly lower ODA quality 
(at the one-percent level). Government expenditure on the other hand is associated with higher ODA 
quality, suggesting that governments with higher expenditure have more experience with 
redistribution. Openness does not have a significant relationship with ODA quality. ODA quality 
decreases with the degree of political globalization and the existence of an aid agency, both at the ten-
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 See Eichenauer and Reinsberg (2015) on the various types of multilateral aid and budget decisions. 
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percent level of significance. While the effect of political globalization is surprising as one would 
expect more globalized countries to embrace a greater role in international development, aid agencies 
have higher administration costs which might harm the share of quality ODA. Finally, the positive and 
highly significant coefficient on (log) colonial history suggests that stronger ties with developing 
countries could give former colonial powers insights into where aid will be most effective and how to 
channel their aid more efficiently. 
 Turning to our variables of interest, we find a positive association between female minister 
and the quality of ODA, which is statistically significant at the ten-percent level in column 2. 
Interpreting the size of the effect, we find that ODA quality increases by 1.0 percentage points when a 
woman directs development policy. Even though this effect is not of a large magnitude and only 
corresponds to US$ 28 million of additional quality ODA annually when holding gross aid constant, 
the result supports the idea that women and men differ in their preferences. Strikingly, however, the 
coefficient on female gov. head has the opposite sign and is statistically significant at the five-percent 
level. Specifically, we find that ODA quality decreases by 2.4 percentage points when a woman leads 
government. Women in the highest political position might feel the urge to overcome the gender 
stereotype as discussed by Koch and Fulton (2011). Consequently, female heads of government might 
support more self-interested aid giving than their male counterparts.42 The insignificant coefficient on 
female parliament suggests that no comparable gender difference exists at the legislative level. We 
conclude that gender differences in aid quality cannot be generalized and depend on the specific 
position under analysis. 
With respect to political ideology, we find no significant relationship between our variables 
and the quality of ODA. This non-finding applies to development ministers, heads of government, the 
ideological differences of the former and latter, and also to the ideology of parliamentarians. We 
conclude that the quality of ODA is independent of the political ideology of the relevant decision-
makers. 
 Continuing with development ministers’ experience, we find that ministers’ professional 
experience in development cooperation as well as their experience in office matter for the quality of 
ODA. According to column 2, ministers with specific development experience succeed in increasing 
aid quality by 1.1 percentage points. Assuming gross aid to be constant, the average donor provides 
US$ 30 million of additional quality ODA annually if a development minister with such a background 
comes to power. Accordingly, we find some support for our hypothesis that ministers with 
development experience deliver higher quality ODA—either because they have acquired knowledge 
of how aid can be more effective or because they have a higher intrinsic motivation to give quality 
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 The comparison of regressions that exclude (column 1) and include (column 2) government-head and 
legislative controls supports our decision to include these variables. In column 1, female minister supposedly 
absorbs part of the negative effect of female gov. head, leaving female minister with an insignificant and less 
positive coefficient than in column 2. 
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ODA. Also, development ministers shift more resources to “development-friendlier” activities as they 
gain experience on the job. One additional year in office raises the share of quality ODA given on 
average by 0.2 percentage points, amounting to US$ 4.7 million for the average donor (column 2). 
Among the three variables capturing the ministers’ experience, economics minister is the only one not 
to reach statistical significance at conventional levels. Economists thus neither appear to be more 
selfish in the sense that they provide lower quality aid, nor more able to raise aid quality. Also, the 
corresponding government-head experience variables do not reach statistical significance in our 
regressions. 
 The lagged DV reaches statistical significance at the five-percent level when we include it in 
column 3. The quality of aid thus appears to be path dependent although the relationship is weaker 
than for aid quantity. The results for most control variables are similar compared to the specifications 
excluding the lagged DV in columns 1 and 2. Only gov. expenditure and political globalization lose 
statistical significance at conventional levels. Most notably, our findings for the minister 
characteristics are robust and the statistical significance of female minister, prof. dev. coop. minister 
and tenure minister actually increase from the ten-percent to the five-percent level.43 
 Since the average number of years per panel is 16 when using donor-country-fixed effects 
with lagged DV (column 3), we correct for the Nickell bias in column 4 by applying the Bruno 
(2005b) correction procedure explained above. As the bias adjustment with instrumental variables 
requires bootstrapped standard errors, we run 50 repetitions following Potrafke (2009). While all 
coefficients in column 4 are similar in magnitude when compared to column 3, only the lagged DV, 
the debt-to-GDP ratio, (log) colonial history and female gov. head remain statistically significant at 
conventional levels. When we introduce government-head fixed effects in column 5, the lagged DV is 
the only control variable that continues to have a significant relationship with aid quality. The loss in 
significance in column 4, however, is explained by the bootstrapping procedure rather than by the bias 
adjustment itself. With up to five repetitions, our results from column 3 stay robust and even increase 
their level of significance (results are available upon request). We are thus reassured that our results 
are meaningful, even though they do not survive all robustness tests. 
Summing up, we find evidence that the ministers’ gender and experience matter for ODA 
quality. As hypothesized, development ministers’ experience, in the form of prior professional 
experience in development cooperation and within their office, increases the quality of ODA. 
Although female ministers appear to provide higher-quality ODA, the opposite is true for aid given 
during the terms of female heads of government. This finding thus cautions against generalizations 
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 This is the only specification in which right-wing gov. head becomes statistically significant. Governments led 
by right-wing politicians seem to provide an aid quality that is 2 percentage points higher according to column 3. 
This finding is the opposite of our expectation that right-wing politicians might link more domestic economic 
benefits to aid, leading to lower ODA quality. However, we do not put much emphasis on this finding as the 
coefficient is only significant at the ten-percent level and does not hold in any other specification. 
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about gender differences in aid giving and highlights that such differences depend on the specific 
position in the political hierarchy being considered. However, most of these findings lack robustness 
to specifications using the bias adjustment for unbalanced dynamic panels and government-head fixed 
effects. We find no evidence that ministers’ ideology or an education in economics affect ODA 
quality. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Development ministers play an important role in determining aid outcomes but the importance of their 
role in this office often goes unnoticed by their home country. According to a poll conducted in 
September 2014 by Forsa, only 2 percent of Germans know that Gerd Müller is their development 
minister.44 Almost two years after the French development minister Pascal Canfin took office in May 
2012 (and shortly before he was removed again), a French news magazine still listed him among the 
“unknown ministers.”45 In sharp contrast to the disinterest in development issues in many 
governments, parliaments and the general public, aid decisions taken at donor ministries can have 
huge impacts on the ground as DAC countries alone provide more than US$ 100 billion annually to 
the developing world. Building on the burgeoning literature on political leadership, this paper is an 
attempt to assess how the personal characteristics of the government member responsible for 
development cooperation (“development minister” in short) affect the quantity and quality of ODA. 
To examine this research question, we introduce a novel database covering all development 
ministers of OECD-DAC countries since the OECD started reporting detailed ODA flows in 1967. 
The outcome is a dataset covering 320 ministers, active in 23 countries over 46 years. Using panel 
econometric models, we then estimate the impact of development ministers’ personal characteristics 
on (1) the size of aid budgets, and (2) aid quality as operationalized by the foreign-aid component of 
the Commitment to Development Index (CDI). Specifically, we test the role of the minister’s gender, 
political ideology, prior professional experience in development cooperation, education in economics, 
and time in office. In order to identify a genuine effect stemming from the personal characteristics of 
the development minister, we control for the corresponding personal characteristics of the respective 
head of government as well as donor-country- and time-fixed effects. As a test for robustness, we also 
run regressions with government-head-fixed effects. 
 Our results show that experience matters. In line with our expectations, we find that the 
minister’s political experience as measured by their time in office plays an important role for the 
                                                     
44
 See poll “stern-RTL Wahltrend” available at http://www.stern.de/politik/deutschland/stern-rtl-wahltrend-das-
milieu-der-afd-waehler-ist-rechtspopulistisch-bis-rechtsradikal-2137035.html (accessed 27 November 2014). 
45
 “Ces ministres dont on ne connait toujours pas le nom,” Valeursactuelles.com, 3 March 2014, available at 
http://www.valeursactuelles.com/politique/ces-ministres-dont-on-ne-connait-toujours-pas-le-nom-43891 (last 
accessed 8 December 2014. 
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quantity of aid: one additional year in office increases total ODA volume by 0.7 percent (controlling 
for the total ODA volume of the previous year). More experienced ministers are thus more likely to 
raise their countries’ aid level closer to the UN target to provide 0.7 percent of GNI as development 
aid. With respect to the quality of aid, one additional year in office raises the share of quality ODA by 
0.2 percentage points. Ministers with prior work experience in the field of development cooperation 
provide on average 1.1 percentage points larger share of quality ODA than ministers that lack such 
experience. Moreover, female ministers appear to be more successful in providing quality ODA than 
their male counterparts: the share of quality ODA increases by 1 percentage point when women lead 
the ministry responsible for development cooperation. However, these findings for aid quality lack 
robustness to specifications using the Bruno (2005a) procedure to correct the Nickell bias. 
We thus conclude that some of the development ministers’ personal characteristics influence 
aid giving but they do not matter much overall. This finding stands in contrast to the significant impact 
that scholars have found for the characteristics of heads of government, central bank governors, and 
finance ministers. Why are development ministers different? There are several potential explanations 
for this. First, an extensive strand of literature has shown that development aid is allocated due to 
national geostrategic and commercial interests (e.g., Alesina and Dollar 2000; Fleck and Kilby 2010; 
Dreher et al. 2015b). The defense of national interests ties too closely into the agenda of heads of 
government and parliamentarians and this might limit the room for development ministers to 
maneuver. This explanation would be in line with our finding that the gender and ideological 
composition of parliaments and some of the government-head characteristics are statistically 
significant in our regressions. Second, our analysis shows that it is not the ideology of ministers or 
heads of governments that directly matters for the quantity of ODA, but rather diverging ideologies 
that play a role. This finding hints at the important role of the negotiation process within governments 
that deserves closer investigation. 
We leave several questions for future research. Since the importance of non-DAC donors in 
international development cooperation is rapidly growing (e.g., Dreher et al. 2013), future research 
should analyze the role of development minister characteristics in these donors’ aid policies. Given 
that most of the big emerging donors are non-democratic and have weaker institutions than their DAC 
counterparts, the role of minister characteristics in these countries might be larger as a result of the 
fewer checks and balances that they have in place. Moreover, it would be necessary to test our 
explanations as to why ministers’ characteristics do not show the expected effects by including 
variables capturing, for instance, donors’ geostrategic or commercial interests. This undertaking would 
require a dyadic study design, including donor and recipient countries. Finally, future research could 
delve deeper into the role of ministers’ professional backgrounds and test whether their prior 
professions affect the sectoral allocation of ODA.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable name Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
(log) ODA commitments 919 21.50 1.40 17.12 24.37 
(log) ODA disbursements 957 21.30 1.51 16.46 24.21 
Quality ODA 389 41.74 11.31 0.00 69.24 
(log) GDP per capita 931 10.41 0.39 9.11 11.53 
Openness 940 69.14 45.22 9.68 352.90 
Gov. expenditure 940 18.71 3.69 8.09 28.06 
Debt 957 52.15 32.90 0.00 238.03 
Political globalization 883 85.85 11.64 45.34 98.43 
Aid agency 957 0.42 0.49 0 1 
(log) Colonial history 957 10.33 8.70 0.00 21.56 
Female minister 957 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Female gov. head 957 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Female parliament 949 16.66 11.91 0.00 47.30 
Right-wing minister 957 0.31 0.40 -0.50 1.00 
Right-wing gov. head 957 0.31 0.35 -0.50 1.00 
Right-wing parliament 934 0.27 0.17 -0.43 0.78 
Ideological difference 957 0.27 0.44 0 1 
Prof. dev. coop. minister 957 0.16 0.36 0 1 
Prof. dev. coop. gov. head 957 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Economics minister 957 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Economics gov. head 957 0.30 0.46 0 1 
Tenure minister 957 2.99 2.35 1 15 
Tenure gov. head 957 4.34 3.12 1 18 
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Table 2: Development minister characteristics and total ODA budgets (1971-2012) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
(log) Total 
ODA com. 
(log) Total 
ODA disb. 
(log) Total 
ODA com. 
(log) Total 
ODA disb. 
(log) Total 
ODA com. 
(log) Total 
ODA disb. 
Lagged DV 0.4749*** 0.6983*** 0.4786*** 0.6534*** 0.0977 0.2929*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.102] [0.000] 
(log) GDP per capita 1.3037*** 0.8102*** 1.3361*** 1.0034*** 2.2243*** 1.9813*** 
  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Openness 0.0012 0.0008 0.0016 0.0016*** -0.0008 -0.0016* 
  [0.225] [0.111] [0.106] [0.006] [0.558] [0.070] 
Gov. expenditure 0.0176** 0.0099 0.0157* 0.0103 0.0365** 0.0390*** 
  [0.036] [0.148] [0.062] [0.117] [0.022] [0.004] 
Debt -0.0015*** -0.0009*** -0.0013*** -0.0013*** -0.0010 -0.0004 
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.004] [0.000] [0.281] [0.454] 
Political globalization 0.0049** 0.0024* 0.0061** 0.0044** 0.0052 0.0059* 
  [0.023] [0.088] [0.023] [0.022] [0.237] [0.064] 
Aid agency 0.0303 0.0768*** 0.0195 0.0854*** 0.0211 0.2086** 
  [0.367] [0.004] [0.547] [0.002] [0.826] [0.012] 
(log) Colonial history -0.2223*** -0.1263** -0.1287* -0.1038* -0.4381 -0.5387*** 
  [0.005] [0.030] [0.084] [0.078] [0.233] [0.003] 
Female minister -0.0355 -0.0219 -0.0274 -0.0268 -0.0362 -0.0435 
  [0.106] [0.256] [0.195] [0.176] [0.254] [0.146] 
Female gov. head 0.0076 0.0220 
  [0.820] [0.380] 
Female parliament   0.0068*** 0.0043**   
   [0.001] [0.022]   
Right-wing minister 0.0071 -0.0061 0.0035 -0.0330 0.0196 0.0109 
  [0.728] [0.670] [0.909] [0.112] [0.711] [0.731] 
Right-wing gov. head -0.0106 0.0086 
  [0.799] [0.748] 
Right-wing parliament   -0.0054 0.2341**   
   [0.951] [0.012]   
Ideological difference   0.0700*** 0.0386**   
   [0.001] [0.013]   
Prof. dev. coop. minister 0.0168 0.0263 0.0018 0.0231 -0.0496 -0.0034 
  [0.485] [0.145] [0.940] [0.176] [0.173] [0.910] 
Prof. dev. coop. gov. head -0.0012 0.0046 
[0.967] [0.828] 
Economics minister 0.0166 0.0165 0.0044 0.0100 -0.0037 -0.0026 
  [0.341] [0.172] [0.783] [0.403] [0.907] [0.906] 
Economics gov. head 0.0435* 0.0434** 
  [0.085] [0.033] 
Tenure minister 0.0072** 0.0046* 0.0069** 0.0058** 0.0087 0.0069** 
  [0.047] [0.068] [0.048] [0.033] [0.140] [0.047] 
Tenure gov. head -0.0021 -0.0032* 
  [0.386] [0.096] 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Gov. head FE No No No No Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 836 866 808 838 836 866 
R-squared (within) 0.813 0.917 0.818 0.916 0.459 0.647 
Number of countries 23 23 23 23 23 23 
Number of gov. heads 182 187 180 185 182 187 
Average number of years 36.4 37.7 35.1 36.4 4.6 4.6 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the government-head level (in brackets). * (**, ***) indicates statistical 
significance at the ten-percent (five-percent, one-percent) level.  
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Table 3: Development minister characteristics and ODA quality (1995-2011) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  
Quality ODA 
OLS 
Quality ODA 
OLS 
Quality ODA 
OLS 
Quality ODA 
Bruno 
Quality ODA 
Bruno 
Lagged DV   0.2449** 0.3393*** 0.2138*** 
    [0.038] [0.000] [0.002] 
(log) GDP per capita 15.2759** 16.9968** 11.1843** 10.9568 28.9999 
  [0.026] [0.014] [0.026] [0.335] [0.168] 
Openness 0.0348 0.0354 0.0164 0.0193 0.0186 
  [0.242] [0.213] [0.524] [0.638] [0.762] 
Gov. expenditure 1.1572*** 0.9757** 0.5387 0.4945 1.2607 
  [0.003] [0.024] [0.256] [0.179] [0.175] 
Debt -0.1178*** -0.1009*** -0.0634*** -0.0505* -0.0371 
[0.000] [0.000] [0.008] [0.054] [0.331] 
Political globalization -0.2675* -0.2317* -0.1476 -0.1726 -0.0776 
  [0.055] [0.077] [0.199] [0.300] [0.738] 
Aid agency -1.7096* -1.8045* -1.6019** -1.5264 -2.3679 
  [0.070] [0.073] [0.040] [0.198] [0.378] 
(log) Colonial history 16.9263*** 16.7040*** 17.3956*** 17.3029** 21.9999 
  [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.036] [0.285] 
Female minister 0.8782 1.0448* 1.2345** 1.1648 0.7154 
  [0.118] [0.099] [0.010] [0.147] [0.560] 
Female gov. head  -2.4266** -3.1056** -3.0377*  
   [0.046] [0.024] [0.054]  
Female parliament  0.1193 -0.0432 -0.0574  
 [0.231] [0.605] [0.677]  
Right-wing minister 0.4247 -0.6945 -0.6600 -0.5684 -0.7317 
  [0.624] [0.529] [0.421] [0.700] [0.703] 
Right-wing gov. head  2.1887 2.0506* 1.8603  
   [0.122] [0.054] [0.272]  
Right-wing parliament  -5.1830 -4.3708 -3.9939  
 [0.134] [0.161] [0.434]  
Ideological difference  0.1781 -0.1828 -0.1167  
 [0.801] [0.752] [0.896]  
Prof. dev. coop. minister 1.2172** 1.1406* 1.1491** 1.2500 0.8174 
  [0.047] [0.088] [0.044] [0.190] [0.577] 
Prof. dev. coop. gov. head -2.5437 -2.0237 -2.0186  
[0.120] [0.113] [0.233]  
Economics minister -0.7844 -0.9859 -0.5221 -0.4136 0.2759 
  [0.161] [0.137] [0.304] [0.570] [0.826] 
Economics gov. head -0.1709 -0.4718 -0.5165  
  [0.828] [0.472] [0.508]  
Tenure minister 0.1207 0.1693* 0.1703** 0.1738 0.1131 
  [0.241] [0.089] [0.040] [0.173] [0.553] 
Tenure gov. head  0.0945 0.0758 0.0739  
  [0.345] [0.331] [0.538]  
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Gov. head FE No No No No Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 389 387 365 365 366 
R-squared (within) 0.231 0.263 0.288   
Number of countries 23 23 23 23 23 
Number of gov. heads 88 88 82 82 82 
Average number of years 16.9 16.8 15.9 15.9 4.5 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered at the government-head level (in brackets). * (**, ***) indicates statistical 
significance at the ten-percent (five-percent, one-percent) level. 
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Figure 1: Personal characteristics of development ministers (1967-2012) 
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Figure 2: ODA quantity (1967-2012) and ODA quality (1995-2011) 
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Appendix A1: List of development ministers (23 DAC countries, 1967-2012) 
Country Year Name Gender Ideology Experience 
dev. coop. 
Economics 
education 
Tenure 
Australia 1967 Paul Hasluck male 0.5 1 0 4 
Australia 1969 Gordon Freeth male 0.5 0 0 1 
Australia 1970 William McMahon male 0.5 0 1 1 
Australia 1971 Leslie Bury male 0.5 1 1 1 
Australia 1972 Nigel Bowen male 0.5 0 0 1 
Australia 1973 Gough Whitlam male 0 0 0 1 
Australia 1974 Donald Robert Willsee male 0 0 0 1 
Australia 1976 Andrew Peacock male 0.5 1 0 1 
Australia 1981 Anthony Austin Street male 0.5 0 0 1 
Australia 1983 Bill Hayden male 0 0 1 1 
Australia 1989 Gareth Evans male 0 0 1 1 
Australia 1996 Alexander Downer male 0.5 0 1 1 
Australia 2008 Stephen Smith male 0 0 0 1 
Australia 2011 Kevin Rudd male 0 1 0 1 
Australia 2012 Bob Carr male 0 0 0 1 
Austria 1967 Lujo Toncic-Sorinj male 0.5 0 0 2 
Austria 1968 Kurt Josef Waldheim male 0.5 1 0 1 
Austria 1970 Rudolf Kirchschläger male 0 0 0 1 
Austria 1974 Erich Bielka-Karltreu male 0 1 0 1 
Austria 1977 Willibald Pahr male 0 0 0 1 
Austria 1983 Erwin Lanc male 0 0 0 1 
Austria 1985 Leopold Gratz male 0 0 0 1 
Austria 1986 Peter Jankowitsch male 0 1 0 1 
Austria 1987 Alois Mock male 0.5 0 0 1 
Austria 1995 Wolfgang Schüssel male 0.5 0 0 1 
Austria 2000 Benita-Maria Ferrero-Waldner female 0.5 1 0 1 
Austria 2005 Ursula Plassnik female 0.5 0 0 1 
Austria 2009 Michael Spindelegger male 0.5 0 0 1 
Belgium 1967 Pierre Harmel male 0.5 0 0 2 
Belgium 1969 Raymond Scheyven male 0.5 1 0 1 
Belgium 1972 Lucien Harmegnies male -0.5 0 0 1 
Belgium 1973 Guy Cudell male -0.5 0 0 1 
Belgium 1974 Renaat van Elslande male 0 0 0 1 
Belgium 1977 Lucien Outers male 1 0 0 1 
Belgium 1979 Mark Eyskens male 0 0 1 1 
Belgium 1981 Daniel Coens male 0 0 0 1 
Belgium 1982 Jacqueline Mayence-Goossens female 1 0 0 1 
Belgium 1983 Francois-Xavier de Donnea male 1 0 1 1 
Belgium 1986 André Kempinaire male 1 0 0 1 
Belgium 1988 André Geens male 0 0 1 1 
Belgium 1992 Erik Derycke male 0 0 0 1 
Belgium 1995 Reginald Moreels male 0 1 0 1 
Belgium 2000 Eddy Boutmans male -0.5 0 0 1 
Belgium 2004 Marc Verwilghen male 0.5 0 0 1 
Belgium 2005 Armand de Decker male 0.5 0 0 1 
Belgium 2008 Charles Michel male 0.5 0 0 1 
Belgium 2011 Olivier Chastel male 0.5 0 0 1 
Belgium 2012 Paul Magnette male 0 0 0 1 
Canada 1967 Paul Joseph James Martin male 0 0 0 5 
Canada 1968 Mitchell Sharp male 0 0 0 1 
Canada 1975 Allan MacEachen male 0 0 1 1 
Canada 1977 Donald Jamieson male 0 0 0 1 
Canada 1979 Flora MacDonald female 0.5 0 0 1 
Canada 1980 Mark MacGuigan male 0 0 0 1 
Canada 1983 Allan MacEachen male 0 0 1 3 
Canada 1985 Monique Vézina female 0.5 0 0 1 
Canada 1986 Monique Landry female 0.5 0 0 1 
Canada 1993 Monique Vézina female 0.5 0 0 2 
Canada 1994 André Ouellet male 0 0 0 1 
Canada 1996 Pierre Pettigrew male 0 0 0 1 
Canada 1997 Diane Marleau female 0 0 1 1 
Canada 2000 Maria Minna female 0 0 0 1 
Canada 2002 Susan Whelan female 0 0 0 1 
Canada 2004 Aileen Carroll female 0 0 0 1 
Canada 2006 Josée Verner female 0.5 0 0 1 
Canada 2008 Beverley Oda female 0.5 0 0 1 
Switzerland 1967 Willy Spühler male 0 0 1 2 
Switzerland 1970 Pierre Graber male 0 0 1 1 
Switzerland 1978 Pierre Aubert male 0 0 0 1 
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Country Year Name Gender Ideology Experience 
dev. coop. 
Economics 
education 
Tenure 
Switzerland 1988 René Felber male 0 0 0 1 
Switzerland 1993 Flavio Cotti male 0.5 0 0 1 
Switzerland 1999 Joseph Deiss male 0.5 0 1 1 
Switzerland 2003 Micheline Calmy-Rey female 0 0 1 1 
Switzerland 2012 Didier Burkhalter male 1 0 1 1 
Germany 1967 Hans-Jürgen Wischnewski male 0 0 0 1 
Germany 1969 Erhard Eppler male 0 0 0 1 
Germany 1975 Egon Bahr male 0 0 0 1 
Germany 1977 Marie Schlei female 0 0 0 1 
Germany 1978 Rainer Offergeld male 0 0 0 1 
Germany 1983 Jürgen Warnke male 0.5 0 0 1 
Germany 1987 Hans Klein male 0.5 0 0 1 
Germany 1989 Jürgen Warnke male 0.5 0 0 5 
Germany 1991 Carl-Dieter Spranger male 0.5 0 0 1 
Germany 1999 Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul female 0 0 0 1 
Germany 2010 Dirk Niebel male 1 0 0 1 
Denmark 1967 Jens Otto Krag male 0 0 1 6 
Denmark 1968 Poul Hartling male 1 0 0 1 
Denmark 1972 Knud Børge Andersen male 0 0 0 1 
Denmark 1974 Ove Guldberg male 1 0 0 1 
Denmark 1975 Knud Børge Andersen male 0 0 0 3 
Denmark 1979 Henning Christophersen male 1 0 1 1 
Denmark 1980 Kjeld Olesen male 0 0 0 1 
Denmark 1983 Uffe Ellemann-Jensen male 1 0 1 1 
Denmark 1993 Helle Degn female 0 0 0 1 
Denmark 1995 Poul Nielson male 0 1 0 1 
Denmark 2000 Jan Trøjborg male 0 0 0 1 
Denmark 2001 Anita Bay Bundegaard female 0.5 0 0 1 
Denmark 2002 Per Stig Møller male 0.5 0 0 1 
Denmark 2005 Ulla Pedersen Tørnæs female 1 0 0 1 
Denmark 2010 Søren Pind male 1 0 0 1 
Denmark 2012 Christian Friis Bach male 0.5 1 1 1 
Spain 1980 Marcelino Oreja Aguirre male 0.5 0 0 5 
Spain 1981 José Pedro Pérez-Llorca male 0.5 0 0 1 
Spain 1983 Fernando Morán male 0 0 0 1 
Spain 1986 Francisco Fernández Ordóñez male 0 0 0 1 
Spain 1992 Javier Solana male 0 0 0 1 
Spain 1996 Abel Matutes male 0.5 0 1 1 
Spain 2000 Josep Piqué male 0.5 0 1 1 
Spain 2003 Ana Palacio female 0.5 0 0 1 
Spain 2004 Miguel Ángel Moratinos male 0 1 0 1 
Spain 2011 Trinidad Jiménez female 0 0 0 1 
Spain 2012 José Garcia-Margallo y Marfil male 0.5 0 0 1 
Finland 1967 Ahti Kalle Samuli Karjalainen male 0.5 0 0 4 
Finland 1970 Väinö Olavi Leskinen male 0 0 0 1 
Finland 1972 Taisto Kalevi Sorsa male 0 0 0 1 
Finland 1973 Ahti Kalle Samuli Karjalainen male 0.5 0 0 7 
Finland 1975 Olavi Johannes Mattila male 0.5 1 1 1 
Finland 1976 Taisto Kalevi Sorsa male 0 0 0 2 
Finland 1977 Paavo Matti Väyrynen male 0.5 0 0 1 
Finland 1982 Pär Olav Mikael Stenbäck male 0.5 0 0 1 
Finland 1983 Paavo Matti Väyrynen male 0.5 0 0 6 
Finland 1987 Taisto Kalevi Sorsa male 0 0 0 3 
Finland 1989 Pertti Kullervo Paasio male 0 0 0 1 
Finland 1991 Toimi Olavi Kankaanniemi male 0.5 0 0 1 
Finland 1994 Pekka Olavi Haavisto male -0.5 0 0 1 
Finland 1999 Satu Maijastiina Hassi female -0.5 0 0 1 
Finland 2002 Suvi-Anne Siimes female -0.5 0 1 1 
Finland 2003 Paula Ilona Lehtomäki female 0.5 0 1 1 
Finland 2007 Paavo Matti Väyrynen male 0.5 0 0 10 
Finland 2011 Heidi Hautala female -0.5 1 0 1 
France 1967 Yvon Bourges male 0.5 1 0 1 
France 1973 Pierre Billecocq male 0.5 0 0 1 
France 1974 Pierre Abelin male 0.5 1 0 1 
France 1976 Jean de Lipkowski male 0.5 1 0 1 
France 1977 Robert Galley male 0.5 0 0 1 
France 1981 Jean-Pierre Cot male -0.5 0 0 1 
France 1983 Christian Nucci male -0.5 1 0 1 
France 1986 Michel Aurillac male 0.5 1 0 1 
France 1988 Jacques Pelletier male 0 0 0 1 
France 1991 Edwige Avice female -0.5 0 1 1 
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Country  Year Name Gender Ideology Experience 
dev. coop. 
Economics 
education 
Tenure 
France 1992 Marcel Debarge male -0.5 0 0 1 
France 1993 Michel Roussin male 0.5 0 0 1 
France 1995 Jacques Godfrain male 0.5 0 1 1 
France 1997 Charles Josselin male -0.5 0 0 1 
France 2002 Pierre-André Wiltzer male 0.5 0 0 1 
France 2004 Xavier Darcos male 0.5 0 0 1 
France 2005 Brigitte Giradin female 0.5 1 0 1 
France 2007 Jean-Marie Bockel male 0 0 0 1 
France 2008 Alain Joyandet male 0.5 0 0 1 
France 2011 Henri de Raincourt male 0.5 0 0 1 
France 2012 Pascal Canfin male -0.5 0 0 1 
UK 1967 Arthur Bottomley male 0 0 0 1 
UK 1968 Reginald Prentice male 0 0 1 1 
UK 1970 Richard Wood male 1 0 1 1 
UK 1974 Judith Hart female 0 1 1 1 
UK 1975 Reginald Prentice male 0 1 1 3 
UK 1977 Judith Hart female 0 1 1 2 
UK 1979 Harry Neil Marten male 1 0 0 1 
UK 1983 Timothy Raison male 1 0 0 1 
UK 1987 Christopher Patten male 1 0 0 1 
UK 1990 Lynda Chalker female 1 0 0 1 
UK 1997 Clare Short female 0 1 0 1 
UK 2003 Valerie Ann Amos female 0 1 0 1 
UK 2004 Hilary Benn male 0 1 0 1 
UK 2007 Douglas Alexander male 0 0 0 1 
UK 2010 Andrew Mitchell male 1 1 0 1 
Greece 1996 Theodoros Pangalos male 0 0 1 1 
Greece 1999 Georgios A. Papandreou male 0 0 0 1 
Greece 2004 Petros Molyviatis male 0.5 1 0 1 
Greece 2006 Dora Bakoyannis female 0.5 0 0 1 
Greece 2010 Georgios A. Papandreou male 0 0 0 6 
Greece 2011 Stavros Lambrinidis male 0 0 1 1 
Greece 2012 Dimitris Avramopoulos male 0.5 1 0 1 
Ireland 1974 Garret FitzGerald male 0.5 0 1 2 
Ireland 1978 Michael O'Kennedy male 0 0 0 1 
Ireland 1980 Brian Lenihan male 0 0 0 1 
Ireland 1982 Gerry Collins male 0 0 0 1 
Ireland 1983 Peter Barry male 0.5 0 0 1 
Ireland 1987 Brian Lenihan male 0 0 0 3 
Ireland 1990 Gerry Collins male 0 0 0 2 
Ireland 1992 David Andrews male 0 0 0 1 
Ireland 1993 Tom Kitt male 0 0 0 1 
Ireland 1995 Joan Burton female -0.5 0 1 1 
Ireland 1997 Liz O'Donnell female 1 0 0 1 
Ireland 2002 Tom Kitt male 0 0 0 3 
Ireland 2005 Conor Lenihan male 0 0 1 1 
Ireland 2007 Michael Kitt male 0 0 0 1 
Ireland 2008 Peter Power male 0 0 0 1 
Ireland 2011 Jan O'Sullivan female -0.5 0 0 1 
Ireland 2012 Joe Costello male -0.5 0 0 1 
Italy 1967 Giulio Andreotti male 0.5 0 0 2 
Italy 1969 Mario Tanassi male -0.5 0 0 1 
Italy 1970 Silvio Gava male 0.5 0 0 1 
Italy 1972 Mauro Ferri male -0.5 0 0 1 
Italy 1974 Ciriaco De Mita male 0.5 0 0 1 
Italy 1975 Carlo Donat-Cattin male 0.5 0 0 1 
Italy 1979 Franco Nicolazzi male -0.5 0 0 1 
Italy 1980 Antonio Bisaglia male 0.5 0 0 1 
Italy 1981 Giovanni Marcora male 0.5 0 0 1 
Italy 1983 Filippo Maria Pandolfi male 0.5 0 0 1 
Italy 1984 Renato Altissimo male 0.5 0 0 1 
Italy 1987 Adolfo Battaglia male 0 0 0 1 
Italy 1991 Guido Bodrato male 0.5 0 0 1 
Italy 1992 Giuseppe Guarino male 0.5 0 0 1 
Italy 1993 Paolo Savona male 0 0 1 1 
Italy 1994 Vito Gnutti male 0.5 0 0 1 
Italy 1995 Alberto Clo male 0 0 0 1 
Italy 1996 Pierluigi Bersani male -0.5 0 0 1 
Italy 2000 Enrico Letta male -0.5 0 0 1 
Italy 2001 Antonio Marzano male 0.5 0 0 1 
Italy 2005 Claudio Scajola male 0.5 0 0 1 
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Country Year Name Gender Ideology Experience 
dev. coop. 
Economics 
education 
Tenure 
Italy 2006 Pierluigi Bersani male 0 0 0 5 
Italy 2008 Claudio Scajola male 0.5 0 0 2 
Italy 2010 Silvio Berlusconi male 0.5 0 0 1 
Italy 2011 Paolo Romani male 0.5 0 0 1 
Italy 2012 Corrado Passera male 0.5 0 1 1 
Japan 1967 Takeo Miki male 0.5 0 0 1 
Japan 1969 Kiichi Aichi male 0.5 0 0 1 
Japan 1971 Takeo Fukuda male 0.5 0 0 1 
Japan 1973 Masayoshi Ohira male 0.5 0 1 3 
Japan 1975 Kiichi Miyazawa male 0.5 0 0 1 
Japan 1977 Iichiro Hatoyama male 0.5 0 0 1 
Japan 1978 Sunao Sonoda male 0.5 0 0 1 
Japan 1980 Saburo Okita male 0.5 0 0 1 
Japan 1981 Sunao Sonoda male 0.5 0 0 3 
Japan 1982 Yoshio Sakurauchi male 0.5 1 1 1 
Japan 1983 Shintaro Abe male 0.5 0 0 1 
Japan 1987 Tadashi Kuranari male 0.5 0 0 1 
Japan 1988 Sosuke Uno male 0.5 0 0 1 
Japan 1990 Taro Nakayama male 0.5 0 0 1 
Japan 1991 Michio Watanabe male 0.5 0 1 1 
Japan 1993 Tsutomu Hata male 0 0 1 1 
Japan 1994 Yohei Kono male 0.5 0 1 1 
Japan 1996 Yukihiko Ikeda male 0.5 0 0 1 
Japan 1998 Keizo Obushi male 0.5 1 0 1 
Japan 1999 Masahiko Komura male 0.5 0 0 1 
Japan 2000 Yohei Kono male 0.5 0 1 3 
Japan 2001 Makiko Tanaka female 0.5 0 1 1 
Japan 2002 Yoriko Kawaguchi female 0.5 1 1 1 
Japan 2005 Nobutaka Machimura male 0.5 0 1 1 
Japan 2006 Taro Aso male 0.5 0 1 1 
Japan 2008 Masahiko Komura male 0.5 0 0 2 
Japan 2009 Hirofumi Nakasone male 0.5 0 1 1 
Japan 2010 Katsuya Okada male 0 0 0 1 
Japan 2011 Takeaki Matsumoto male 0 0 0 1 
Japan 2012 Koichiro Genba male 0 0 0 1 
South Korea 1987 Choe Gwang-su male 0.5 0 0 2 
South Korea 1989 Choe Ho-jung male 0.5 0 0 1 
South Korea 1991 Lee Sang-ok male 0.5 0 0 1 
South Korea 1993 Han Seung-ju male 0.5 0 0 1 
South Korea 1995 Gong Ro-myeong male 0.5 1 1 1 
South Korea 1997 Yu Jong-ha male 0.5 0 0 1 
South Korea 1998 Park Jeong-su male 0 0 0 1 
South Korea 1999 Hong Sun-yeong male 0 1 0 1 
South Korea 2000 Lee Jeong-bin male 0 1 0 1 
South Korea 2001 Han Seung-su male 0.5 0 1 1 
South Korea 2002 Choe Seong-hong male 0 1 0 1 
South Korea 2003 Yoon Young Kwan male 0.5 0 1 1 
South Korea 2004 Ban Ki-moon male 0.5 1 0 1 
South Korea 2007 Song Min-sun male 0 0 0 1 
South Korea 2008 Yu Myung-hwan male 0.5 1 0 1 
South Korea 2011 Kim Sung-hwan male 0.5 1 1 1 
Luxembourg 1980 Gaston Thorn male 1 0 0 12 
Luxembourg 1981 Colette Flesch female 1 1 1 1 
Luxembourg 1985 Jacques Poos male 0 0 1 1 
Luxembourg 2000 Charles Goerens male 1 0 0 1 
Luxembourg 2004 Jean-Louis Schiltz male 0.5 0 0 1 
Luxembourg 2010 Marie-Josée Jacobs female 0.5 0 0 1 
Netherlands 1967 Berend Jan Udink male 0.5 0 1 1 
Netherlands 1972 Kees Bortien male 0.5 0 0 1 
Netherlands 1973 Jan Pronk male 0 0 1 1 
Netherlands 1978 Jan de Koning male 0.5 1 0 1 
Netherlands 1982 Kees van Dijk male 0.5 1 1 1 
Netherlands 1983 Eegje Schoo female 1 0 0 1 
Netherlands 1987 Pieter Bukman male 0.5 0 0 1 
Netherlands 1990 Jan Pronk male 0 0 1 6 
Netherlands 1999 Eva Herfkens female 0 1 0 1 
Netherlands 2003 Agnes van Ardenne female 0.5 0 0 1 
Netherlands 2007 Albert Gerard Koenders male 0 1 1 1 
Netherlands 2010 Maxime Verhagen male 0.5 1 0 1 
Netherlands 2011 Ben Knapen male 0.5 0 0 1 
Norway 1967 John Lyng male 0.5 0 0 2 
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Country Year Name Gender Ideology Experience 
dev. coop. 
Economics 
education 
Tenure 
Norway 1970 Svenn Stray male 0.5 0 0 1 
Norway 1971 Andreas Zeier Cappelen male 0 0 0 1 
Norway 1973 Dagfinn Varvik male 1 0 1 1 
Norway 1974 Knut Frydenlund male 0 0 0 1 
Norway 1981 Svenn Stray male 0.5 0 0 2 
Norway 1983 Reidun Brusletten female 0.5 0 0 1 
Norway 1986 Vesla Vetlesen male 0 1 0 1 
Norway 1988 Kirsti Kolle Grøndahl female 0 1 0 1 
Norway 1990 Tom Vraalsen male 1 1 1 1 
Norway 1991 Grete Faremo female 0 1 0 1 
Norway 1993 Kari Nordheim-Larsen female 0 0 0 1 
Norway 1998 Hilde Frafjord Johnson female 0.5 0 0 1 
Norway 2000 Anne Kristin Sydnes female 0 0 0 1 
Norway 2002 Hilde Frafjord Johnson female 0.5 1 0 3 
Norway 2006 Erik Solheim male -0.5 1 0 1 
Norway 2012 Heikki Holmås male -0.5 0 1 1 
New Zealand 1967 Keith Holyoake male 1 0 0 8 
New Zealand 1973 Norman Kirk male 0 0 0 1 
New Zealand 1975 Bill Rowling male 0 0 1 1 
New Zealand 1976 Brian Talboys male 1 0 0 1 
New Zealand 1982 Warren Cooper male 1 0 0 1 
New Zealand 1985 David Lange male 0 0 0 1 
New Zealand 1988 Russell Marshall male 0 0 0 1 
New Zealand 1990 Mike Moore male 0 0 0 1 
New Zealand 1991 Donald Charles McKinnon male 1 0 0 1 
New Zealand 2000 Phil Goff male 0 0 0 1 
New Zealand 2006 Winston Peters male 0 0 0 1 
New Zealand 2009 Murray McCully male 1 0 0 1 
Portugal 1980 Diogo Freitas do Amaral male 0.5 0 0 1 
Portugal 1981 André Gonçalves Pereira male 0.5 1 0 1 
Portugal 1982 Vasco Futscher Pereira male 0.5 1 0 1 
Portugal 1983 Jaime Gama male 0 0 0 1 
Portugal 1986 Pedro Pires de Miranda male 0.5 0 0 1 
Portugal 1988 Joao de Deus Pinheiro male 0.5 0 0 1 
Portugal 1993 José Manuel Barroso male 0.5 0 1 1 
Portugal 1996 Jaime Gama male 0 0 0 4 
Portugal 2002 António Martins da Cruz male 0.5 0 0 1 
Portugal 2004 Teresa Gouveia female 0.5 0 0 1 
Portugal 2005 Diogo Freitas do Amaral male 0.5 1 0 2 
Portugal 2006 Luís Amado male 0 0 1 1 
Portugal 2011 Paulo Portas male 0.5 0 0 1 
Sweden 1967 Alva Myrdal female 0 1 0 1 
Sweden 1974 Gertrud Sigurdsen female 0 0 0 1 
Sweden 1977 Ola Ullsten male 0.5 0 0 1 
Sweden 1983 Lennart Bodström male 0 0 0 1 
Sweden 1986 Lena Hjelm-Wallén female 0 0 0 1 
Sweden 1992 Alf Svensson male 0.5 0 0 1 
Sweden 1995 Pierre Schori male 0 0 0 1 
Sweden 2000 Maj-Inger Klingvall female 0 0 0 1 
Sweden 2002 Jan Olov Karlsson male 0 0 1 1 
Sweden 2004 Carin Jämtin female 0 0 0 1 
Sweden 2007 Gunilla Carlsson female 1 0 1 1 
USA 1967 David Dean Rusk male 0 0 0 7 
USA 1969 William Pierce Rogers male 1 0 0 1 
USA 1974 Henry Kissinger male 1 1 0 1 
USA 1977 Cyrus Vance male 0 0 0 1 
USA 1980 Edmund Muskie male 0 0 0 1 
USA 1981 Alexander Haig male 1 0 1 1 
USA 1983 George Pratt Shultz male 1 0 1 1 
USA 1989 James Baker male 1 0 0 1 
USA 1993 Warren Christopher male 0 0 0 1 
USA 1997 Madeleine Albright female 0 1 0 1 
USA 2001 Colin Powell male 1 0 1 1 
USA 2005 Condoleezza Rice female 1 0 0 1 
USA 2009 Hillary Rodham Clinton female 0 0 0 1 
. 
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